What Are Multi-Currency Accounts?
A multi-currency account holds, sends, and receives funds in multiple currencies from a single platform, eliminating the need for separate accounts in each currency. Major multi-currency providers in 2026 support between 10 and 50+ currencies, with access provided through virtual IBANs, dedicated IBANs, or a combination of both.
The provider, typically an EMI or payment institution authorised under EMD2 (Directive 2009/110/EC) or PSD2 (Directive (EU) 2015/2366), maintains a single platform with internal sub-ledgers for each currency.[1][2] Funds received in one currency settle into the relevant currency ledger; outbound payments draw from the matching balance; intra-platform conversion runs at the provider’s quoted FX spread over the interbank mid. The customer holds one master agreement, one onboarding pack, and one user interface across every currency the account supports.
There are three account structures behind every multi-currency platform. Dedicated IBANs are standalone payment accounts each uniquely assigned to one legal entity and segregated at the bank-account level. Named virtual IBANs are issued in the customer’s name but route to a master safeguarding account at a credit institution. Pooled virtual IBANs share a single master IBAN across many end-users, with attribution maintained on an internal ledger rather than at the bank-account level.[3] The choice of structure determines counterparty acceptance, MiCA compliance, and cost.
For crypto and fintech operators, multi-currency infrastructure is not a convenience layer. Cross-border customer bases generate inbound flows in EUR, GBP, and USD that have to settle at usable spreads. Crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) authorised under MiCA must segregate client fiat under Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114, with deposit at a credit institution by the end of the business day following receipt.[4] The account structure chosen drives whether that obligation is met operationally.
Virtual IBANs vs. Dedicated IBANs
The choice between virtual and dedicated IBANs determines cost, scalability, counterparty acceptance, and MiCA compliance capability. A virtual IBAN (vIBAN) is an identifier that routes payments to a separate master account with a different IBAN; a dedicated IBAN is a standalone payment account uniquely assigned to one legal entity with one-to-one mapping of all flows.[3][5]
Article 2 of the EU Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2024/1624) now defines a virtual IBAN as “an identifier causing payments to be redirected to a payment account identified by an IBAN different from that identifier”.[6] The European Banking Authority (EBA) Report on Virtual IBANs (EBA/Rep/2024/08, ) confirms that vIBANs are “indistinguishable to third parties from a standard IBAN” and that outgoing payments initiated by the end-user of a vIBAN are “debited from the master account”.[3]
Within the vIBAN category, the distinction that drives MiCA, AMLR, and counterparty outcomes is named versus pooled. A named vIBAN is issued in the end-customer’s legal name. The payer’s bank sees the customer paying their own named account, the audit trail is one-to-one, and the structure can satisfy MiCA Article 70(3) when the master sits at a credit institution.[7] A pooled vIBAN routes many end-users into one master IBAN in the name of the EMI or PI; attribution is internal-ledger only. The structure is operationally cheaper, but it cannot pass a name-match check, cannot evidence client-by-client segregation at bank-account level, and faces growing rejection across European corridors.
| Dimension | Named vIBAN | Pooled vIBAN | Dedicated IBAN |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cost | €5–€50/month per IBAN (B2B); often free at consumer tier | Bundled within platform fee; effectively zero marginal cost | €50–€200/month per IBAN plus account-opening fees |
| Scalability | High; unlimited issuance under one master | Highest; shared infrastructure | Low; each requires separate KYB and bank relationship |
| Send/receive | Receive in customer name; outbound from master account in master holder’s name | Receive into pool; outbound from master only, in master holder’s name | Full send and receive in account holder’s own name |
| Counterparty acceptance | Moderate to high; depends on country code and master structure | Low and falling; payer-bank name-match rejections common | Highest; identical to a normal bank account in counterparty eyes |
| API availability | Standard; programmatic issuance with HMAC-signed webhooks | Standard | Available but slower to provision (per-IBAN onboarding) |
| MiCA Art. 70(3) suitability for client fiat | Yes if master sits at a credit institution and segregation is enforced | No; not client-attributable at bank-account level | Yes; native single-account segregation |
| Verification of Payee behaviour (from ) | Passes name-check; payee name returned matches customer | Fails name-check; payee name returned is the master account holder | Passes name-check natively |
In practice, the named-vs-pooled decision is rarely revisited once the architecture is live. Migrating an end-user book off a pooled vIBAN structure onto named IBANs typically takes 3 to 6 months because every existing customer has to re-receive their new IBAN in writing, every counterparty mandate has to be updated, and reconciliation has to be re-pointed across the entire ledger. Pricing direct applicants are quoted at the contract stage rarely reflects this; the cost of a future migration is the operator’s, not the provider’s.
Unlike the choice of currency or payment rail, both of which can be added incrementally as the business scales, the IBAN architecture choice is a one-way door. Moving an end-user book off a pooled vIBAN structure onto named IBANs is a 3-to-6-month migration involving every existing customer, every counterparty mandate, and the entire reconciliation layer. The decision belongs at the start of the placement assessment, not after the first account-opening.
The Verification of Payee (VoP) rule under Regulation (EU) 2024/886 (the Instant Payments Regulation) has applied to euro-area credit institutions since and applies to euro-area EMIs and payment institutions from .[8] The check returns the payee’s name and matches it against the name the payer entered before the transfer settles. Named vIBANs return the end-customer’s name and pass cleanly. Pooled vIBANs return the master account holder’s name, generating “name does not match” warnings on every inbound payment from the moment the rule applies to the sending PSP. The operational impact on businesses still relying on pooled vIBAN models becomes binding for euro-area EMIs from .
IBAN Discrimination: What It Is and How to Manage It
IBAN discrimination is the practice of rejecting or surcharging a transaction because of the country code at the start of the IBAN. It is prohibited under Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 (the SEPA Regulation), and yet it remains widespread in 2026, with Lithuanian (LT) and Belgian (BE) IBANs facing the highest rejection rates in the European market.[9]
“(1) A payer making a credit transfer to a payee holding a payment account located within the Union shall not specify the Member State in which that payment account is to be located, provided that the payment account is reachable in accordance with Article 3.”
“(2) A payee accepting a credit transfer or using a direct debit to collect funds from a payer holding a payment account located within the Union shall not specify the Member State in which that payment account is to be located, provided that the payment account is reachable in accordance with Article 3.”
Member States are required by Articles 10 and 11 of the SEPA Regulation to designate competent authorities and to impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties for breach.[9] Enforcement, in practice, is fragmented. France granted its consumer-protection authority (the DGCCRF) the power to fine €75,000 (natural persons) and €375,000 (legal persons) under Law No. 2021-1308 of . The Italian Competition Authority (AGCM) imposed an €800,000 sanction on Agos Ducato S.p.A. on for refusing SEPA direct-debit repayments from non-Italian IBANs, citing a direct Article 9 breach.[10] The European Court of Auditors Special Report 01/2025 found enforcement across the Union to be uneven and recommended a harmonised penalty regime, which the proposed Payment Services Regulation is expected to deliver.[11]
The clearest quantitative picture of IBAN discrimination in 2025 comes from the Accept My IBAN initiative, an industry coalition of European payment institutions that collects rejection reports through a single public portal. The European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net) published a special report on drawing on 4,688 cumulative complaints submitted between February 2021 and March 2025.[12] The geography of refused IBANs is concentrated: Lithuania accounted for 24% of all refused IBANs, Belgium for 23%, and Germany for 22%. The geography of complainants tells the opposite story: France (22%), Germany (19%), Spain (15%), and Italy (11%) produce most of the reports.[12]
| Country code | Acceptance level | Common issues |
|---|---|---|
| DE (Germany) | High | Some legacy IT still rejects foreign IBANs; DE itself widely accepted |
| NL (Netherlands) | High | DNB-supervised institutions widely accepted; few merchant issues |
| FR (France) | High | Occasional rejection by counterparties outside France; rare |
| LU (Luxembourg) | High | CSSF-supervised; some platform restrictions for CASPs |
| IE (Ireland) | Medium to high | Caution towards non-IE-prefix IBANs of Irish-licensed EMIs (e.g. payment institutions operating cross-border) |
| ES (Spain) | High inbound; mixed bidirectional | Spanish merchants and utilities frequently reject non-ES IBANs |
| BE (Belgium) | Medium | 23% of all refused-IBAN complaints in the Accept My IBAN dataset (ECC-Net 2025) |
| EE (Estonia) | Medium | Bracketed with LT as an EMI hub; legacy reputational drag from 2018-era Baltic AML cases affects perception |
| LT (Lithuania) | Low to medium; highest discrimination rate | 24% of refused-IBAN complaints (ECC-Net 2025); driven by EMI density, CENTROlink direct SEPA access, and licence revocations 2023–2024 |
| MT (Malta) | Low to medium | FATF grey-list legacy (2021–2022) and blockchain-island association still affect perception |
| CY (Cyprus) | Low to medium | 2013 banking-crisis legacy and concentration of CIS-origin client base |
| GB (United Kingdom) | High | SEPA scheme participant but outside the EEA; Art. 9 protections weaker for non-EEA payees |
| CH (Switzerland) | High (non-EEA SEPA) | FINMA-supervised institutions widely accepted; SWIFT remains primary for non-EUR flows |
| AE (UAE) and GE (Georgia) | N/A SEPA; SWIFT only | UAE removed from FATF grey list ; perception improving |
The Lithuanian rejection rate is structural, not incidental. Approximately 70 electronic money institutions hold Bank of Lithuania authorisation as of end-2024, the largest EMI concentration in the EU, with direct SEPA access through the central bank’s CENTROlink hub. High-profile licence revocations across 2023 and 2024, and the EBA’s May 2024 Report flagging vIBAN risks at scale, have together produced a payer-bank pattern that treats LT-prefix IBANs as carrying elevated AML and operational risk regardless of the underlying institution’s actual supervision. Estonia sits closer to the middle of the table, but Bank of Estonia and Finantsinspektsioon-licensed payment institutions still experience friction with non-Baltic counterparties, in part because of the legacy of the 2018 Danske Estonia matter.
There are three operational responses for crypto and fintech businesses caught by IBAN discrimination:
- Obtain a named IBAN in a high-acceptance country code (DE or NL most commonly) through a multi-currency provider that issues local IBANs across multiple jurisdictions under one master agreement.
- Operate a multi-provider IBAN strategy: a DE or NL named IBAN for customer-facing collections, a LT or EE IBAN for operational banking where the underlying institution’s pricing is competitive, and a separate USD account through a US-correspondent-banked provider.
- File complaints through the Accept My IBAN portal, which feeds into the ECC-Net dataset and produces the enforcement pressure the European Court of Auditors has called for.[12]
The common mistake is treating IBAN discrimination as a problem the regulator will fix on the operator’s behalf; until the PSR enforcement regime applies in 2027–2028 the practical path is the multi-provider response above, with complaint-filing as a parallel pressure mechanism rather than a substitute.
Unlike the legacy SEPA Regulation, where enforcement depended on twenty-seven national competent authorities each interpreting “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” in their own way, the PSR is a directly applicable regulation with a harmonised penalty framework. The practical effect is that enforcement risk for an Italian merchant rejecting a Lithuanian IBAN moves from “the AGCM might notice and fine you next year” to “the harmonised regime sets the fine schedule from day one.” For crypto operators currently operating through LT-coded IBANs, the PSR transition window is the planning horizon.
The proposed Payment Services Regulation (PSR), part of the PSD3/PSR package adopted by the Commission on , is expected to strengthen Article 9 enforcement by replacing the directive-and-transposition model with a directly applicable regulation and a harmonised penalty framework.[13] The Council and Parliament reached provisional political agreement in November 2025; COREPER endorsed the trilogue text on ; the European Parliament’s ECON Committee approved the final compromise texts on (PSD3 adopted 55-3-5; PSR adopted 50-2-2), with plenary expected in the Strasbourg part-session.[14]
Publication in the Official Journal is anticipated mid-2026, with application following an expected 21-month transition for the PSR generally and a longer transition (between 24 and 27 months in early commentary, pending the final published text) for the Verification of Payee obligation. The practical effect for IBAN discrimination enforcement is expected in the H2 2027 to H1 2028 window.
Currencies and Coverage
A multi-currency account’s value to a crypto or fintech business depends on which currencies it actually settles, on which rails, and at what spread. The major currencies for European crypto and fintech operators in 2026 are EUR, GBP, USD, CHF, and AED, with growing demand for SGD, HKD, and EU non-euro currencies.
| Currency | Primary rails | Operator | Typical crypto/fintech use case |
|---|---|---|---|
| EUR | SCT, SCT Inst (24/7), TARGET2 | European Payments Council; Eurosystem TIPS / RT1 | Primary EU settlement; CASP fiat segregation under MiCA Art. 70(3) |
| GBP | Faster Payments (24/7), CHAPS, Bacs | Pay.UK; Bank of England RT2 | UK customer collections; FCA-supervised counterparty settlement |
| USD | SWIFT, ACH, Fedwire, FedNow (limit raised to $10m Sept 2025) | Federal Reserve; CHIPS; The Clearing House | Global settlement, OTC trading; requires US correspondent for non-US institutions |
| CHF | SIC, SIC IP (instant), SWIFT | SIX Interbank Clearing on behalf of SNB | FINMA-supervised institutional clients; Swiss-market settlement |
| AED | UAEFTS (RTGS), SWIFT | Central Bank of the UAE | VARA, ADGM, DFSA-aligned operations; in-UAE AED settlement |
| SGD, HKD | FAST (SG), FPS (HK), SWIFT | MAS; HKMA | Asia-Pacific operations; MAS DPT/DTSP and HK SVF-licensed counterparties |
| NOK, SEK, DKK, PLN, CZK, HUF | RTGS and instant rails by jurisdiction (RIX-INST, T2 in DKK from April 2025, AFR in HUF, Express Elixir in PLN) | National central banks; many now TIPS-reachable | Local-market collections and supplier payments |
| 25+ additional currencies (G10 and EM) | SWIFT primary; local rails via correspondent | Multiple central banks via correspondent | Cross-border B2B, payroll, marketplace settlement |
Currency selection is not symmetrical with provider selection. Most mid-tier multi-currency providers advertise 25 to 35 currencies; institutional-grade providers reach 50 or more. What matters operationally is which currencies the provider settles on-rail (with local clearing access) versus off-rail (with all flows routed through SWIFT correspondent). On-rail USD requires a US correspondent relationship that the provider holds; without it, USD inbound and outbound flows take 1 to 3 business days and pay 25 to 50 USD in correspondent fees per outbound transfer. On-rail CHF requires either FINMA recognition or a clearing relationship with a SIX participant. On-rail AED requires Central Bank of the UAE authorisation, and the Rulebook specifically requires Licensed Persons to settle in-UAE AED via UAEFTS.[15]
Experienced operators select a multi-currency provider on the strength of three to five on-rail currencies rather than the headline currency count, because on-rail access is what determines settlement cut-off, correspondent fee, and same-day capability, the metrics that move the P&L.
Editorial position: most multi-currency providers in 2026 lead with their currency count (30, 40, 165), and most of that count is paper coverage with no liquid pricing behind it. The currencies that matter operationally for a crypto or fintech business at scale are five: EUR, GBP, USD, CHF, and the operator’s primary local currency. The right question to ask a provider is not “how many currencies?” but “where do you hold the correspondent relationships and what is the cut-off for same-day settlement in each?”
Client Fund Segregation
Client fund segregation is a legal requirement for crypto-asset service providers under MiCA Article 70(3) and for crypto-asset custodians under Article 75(7), and a prudential requirement for electronic money institutions under EMD2 Article 7. The account structure a business chooses (dedicated, named vIBAN, or pooled) directly determines whether the obligation is met operationally.[4][1]
MiCA distinguishes between two segregation duties that the consultancy market frequently blurs. Article 70(3) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 governs fiat funds held by a CASP on behalf of clients: those funds must be deposited with a credit institution or a central bank by the end of the business day following receipt, in an account separately identifiable from the CASP’s own funds. Article 70(5) provides that the safeguarding duty does not apply where the CASP is itself a credit institution; under MiCA, EMIs and authorised payment institutions providing CASP services are subject to the safeguarding rules of their primary regimes (EMD2 and PSD2) rather than to Article 70(3) in addition.[18] Article 75(7) governs crypto-assets held by a CASP providing custody and administration: client holdings must be kept separate from the CASP’s own holdings, with means of access clearly identified as the client’s.[4]
The segregation clock varies by regime:
- EMD2 Article 7: EMIs must safeguard funds received against issued e-money by no later than five business days after issuance.[1]
- MiCA Article 70(3): a CASP must deposit client fiat at a credit institution by the end of the business day following receipt. That is a materially tighter standard.
- FCA Supplementary Safeguarding Regime: under Policy Statement PS25/12, in force since for UK-authorised PIs and EMIs, reconciliation runs daily on a D+1 basis and the funds must be received directly into a designated safeguarding account with effectively same-day discipline.
The FCA’s Payment Services and Electronic Money Approach Document Version 8, published alongside the Supplementary Regime go-live, is now the operative supervisory text for the safeguarding obligations.[16][19] A business that operates across all three regimes must run to the tightest clock that applies, not the average.
| Account type | MiCA Art. 70(3) suitability | Safeguarding model | Reconciliation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dedicated IBAN at a credit institution | Yes; deposit-protected | DGSD up to €100,000 at the depositor (operator) level | Native; one account per legal entity |
| Dedicated IBAN at an EMI | Yes if EMI safeguards at a credit institution | Segregated at the EMI’s safeguarding bank under EMD2 Art. 7 | D+1 expected; FCA PS25/12 mandates daily for UK-authorised firms |
| Named vIBAN at an EMI | Yes if master sits at a credit institution and customer attribution is enforced | Segregated at the EMI’s safeguarding bank | Automated via vIBAN reference; daily under FCA PS25/12 |
| Pooled vIBAN at an EMI | No; not client-attributable at bank-account level | Pooled at the safeguarding bank | Cannot satisfy MiCA fiat segregation; insufficient under FCA daily-reconciliation expectation |
| Omnibus account at a credit institution | Conditional; requires acknowledgement letter and sub-ledger discipline | Depends on institution and contractual structure | Robust sub-ledger and acknowledgement letter required; commonly used in capital-markets segregation models |
Deposit-protection coverage does not transfer through an EMI to its end-customers. The Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive (Directive 2014/49/EU) protects depositors at credit institutions up to €100,000 per depositor per institution.[17] Where an EMI safeguards client funds at a credit institution, the EMI is the single depositor for DGSD purposes; the €100,000 cap applies once, at EMI level, and not per end-customer. In the EMI’s own insolvency the safeguarded pool is excluded from the general estate and distributed pro rata to clients, but the protection is the safeguarding regime, not deposit insurance. The Financial Conduct Authority’s CP24/20 (), which informed PS25/12, recorded shortfalls of an order of magnitude that would surprise operators relying on a default reading of “safeguarded”.[16]
Unlike most EU regulatory frameworks, where the safeguarding requirement is a process rule, MiCA Article 70(3) is a one-business-day timing rule. Client fiat received by an authorised CASP must be deposited at a credit institution by the end of the business day following receipt. The operational consequence is that the multi-currency account structure has to support same-day or next-day sweep to a credit-institution-tier IBAN; pooled vIBAN structures that net internally before sweeping do not satisfy this obligation, and the time gap shows up in regulator examinations.
How Jagelski & Partners Helps
Jagelski & Partners matches crypto and fintech businesses with multi-currency account providers whose IBAN country codes, currency rails, and client fund segregation model fit the business. The partner network maintains live account-opening routes in every jurisdiction Jagelski & Partners services, and banking feasibility is confirmed at the scoping stage, before any licence application is filed. We assess the operating profile against the network’s current acceptance criteria, present a shortlist of best-fit providers, and coordinate onboarding through to live accounts.
The placement covers three dimensions of the multi-currency decision. Pre-qualification across the network identifies which institutions will underwrite the business model and licence status before any formal application is submitted, removing the rejection-history risk that comes from going door-to-door. IBAN strategy maps which country codes belong on customer-facing collections, operational banking, and counterparty mandates, including local IBAN issuance across DE, NL, FR, IE, LT, and EE where the underlying provider supports it. Segregation compliance maps the account structure against MiCA Article 70(3), EMD2 Article 7, and FCA PS25/12 obligations where the business is in scope.
A single multi-currency provider rarely covers every requirement. The typical architecture for a MiCA-authorised CASP processing EUR and USD volumes runs a DE or NL named-IBAN provider for EU customer-facing collections, a separate USD account through a US-correspondent-banked provider, and a dedicated IBAN at a credit institution for client-fund segregation under Article 70(3). We coordinate the onboarding of all three in parallel so that operational dependency is split from day one. Jagelski & Partners is paid by the institution, not by the client. We do not charge an onboarding fee. We do not mark up institutional banking or EMI pricing.
Jagelski & Partners does not provide custody services, does not hold client funds, and does not guarantee account opening. Pre-qualification identifies institutions most likely to accept the business; it does not commit those institutions to approval. We will not pursue placement for businesses whose model the network cannot underwrite.
Frequently Asked Questions
A virtual IBAN (vIBAN) is an identifier that routes payments to a separate master account with a different IBAN; a dedicated IBAN is a standalone payment account uniquely assigned to one legal entity with one-to-one mapping of all flows. Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 codifies the vIBAN definition. Virtual IBANs come in two operational forms: named (issued in the end-customer’s name) and pooled (shared across many end-users on an internal ledger). Named virtual IBANs and dedicated IBANs both work for MiCA-compliant client fund segregation when properly structured; pooled virtual IBANs do not.
IBAN discrimination is the practice of rejecting or surcharging a transaction because of the country code at the start of the IBAN. It is illegal under Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012, which prohibits payers and payees from specifying the Member State in which a Union payment account is located. Enforcement is fragmented. France can fine offenders up to €375,000 under Law No. 2021-1308; Italy’s Competition Authority imposed a €800,000 sanction on Agos Ducato S.p.A. on for a direct Article 9 breach. The proposed Payment Services Regulation is expected to harmonise enforcement once adopted.
German (DE), Dutch (NL), French (FR), and Luxembourgish (LU) IBANs have the highest acceptance rates in 2026. Lithuanian (LT) IBANs face the highest rejection rate: the ECC-Net special report of records LT IBANs accounting for 24% of all refused-IBAN complaints in the Accept My IBAN dataset, followed by Belgium at 23% and Germany at 22%. Estonian (EE) IBANs sit in the middle of the table; the legacy of pre-2018 Baltic AML cases still affects perception with some counterparties. The practical response is to obtain named IBANs in high-acceptance countries through providers that issue local IBANs across multiple jurisdictions.
Yes, most multi-currency EMIs and payment institutions offer USD as a supported currency. The operational quality depends on whether the EMI holds a direct US correspondent banking relationship. With a correspondent, USD flows settle in 1 to 2 business days at standard SWIFT costs and the EMI can offer on-rail USD pricing. Without a correspondent, all USD flows route through a chain of intermediary banks, typically take 2 to 4 business days, and pay correspondent fees of 15 to 50 USD per outbound payment plus FX spread on incoming USD that is auto-converted on receipt. The provider’s correspondent relationship is the operational question, not the headline currency list.
MiCA Article 70(3) requires a crypto-asset service provider to deposit client fiat (other than e-money tokens) at a credit institution or central bank by the end of the business day following receipt, in an account separately identifiable from the CASP’s own funds. The obligation falls away where the CASP is itself a credit institution, EMI, or payment institution. Article 75(7) separately requires crypto-asset custodians to segregate client crypto-assets from their own holdings, with means of access clearly identified. A dedicated IBAN at a credit institution, or a named virtual IBAN whose master sits at a credit institution with enforced attribution, both satisfy the Article 70(3) duty. Pooled virtual IBANs do not.
Yes, in every regime that imposes safeguarding or segregation. For a CASP, Article 70(3) of MiCA requires client fiat to be held in an account separately identifiable from the CASP’s own funds at a credit institution. For an EMI, Article 7 of EMD2 requires safeguarding through segregation at an authorised credit institution (or an equivalent insurance or guarantee), separate from the EMI’s own working capital. For a UK-authorised PI or EMI under the FCA’s Supplementary Safeguarding Regime (in force since ), funds must be received directly into a designated safeguarding account, reconciled daily, and reported to the FCA monthly. Operating funds remain in the firm’s general accounts.
Verification of Payee (VoP) is a name-match check mandated by Regulation (EU) 2024/886 (the Instant Payments Regulation). It has applied to euro-area credit institutions since and applies to euro-area EMIs and payment institutions from . The payer’s PSP submits the payee’s IBAN and name; the payee’s PSP returns whether the name matches. Named virtual IBANs return the end-customer’s name and pass the check cleanly. Pooled virtual IBANs return the master account holder’s name (the EMI or PI), generating a name-mismatch warning on every inbound payment from a third-party customer. For businesses operating on pooled architectures, VoP is the regulatory event that ends the model.
The Supplementary Safeguarding Regime is the FCA’s Policy Statement PS25/12, published on and in force since , applicable to UK-authorised payment institutions and electronic money institutions. The substantive obligations are: daily (D+1) reconciliation of safeguarded balances, monthly safeguarding regulatory returns to the FCA, an annual independent safeguarding audit by a qualified auditor under the Companies Act 2006, direct receipt of customer funds into a designated safeguarding account, and a named senior manager accountable under the Senior Managers and Certification Regime. Firms with safeguarded balances under £100,000 over the prior 53 weeks are exempt from the audit requirement. The full statutory-trust Post-Repeal Regime is deferred to a later HM Treasury consultation.
Jagelski & Partners is paid by the institution that takes the client’s business, in the form of a referral or revenue-share arrangement. The institution extends this arrangement because the network delivers volume (through Jagelski & Partners’ partner network, businesses placed more than fourteen billion euros in client turnover across banking and EMI relationships in 2025) and because the introductions are pre-qualified, which materially reduces the institution’s onboarding cost. The pricing the client sees on their account-opening documentation is the institutional rate. There is no markup. There is no onboarding fee billed to the client.
No. Jagelski & Partners does not charge a banking onboarding fee. Our compensation is the institution’s referral or revenue-share arrangement, not a fee billed to the client. Optional advisory work, bespoke regulatory advice, or document preparation outside the placement may be quoted as separate engagements, but the banking placement itself does not carry an onboarding fee.
Ready to Place Multi-Currency Accounts That Fit the Way the Business Actually Operates?
Book a multi-currency assessment. We pre-qualify your business across 90+ banking and EMI institutions, present a shortlist of providers whose IBAN country codes, currency rails, and segregation model fit your operating profile, and coordinate onboarding through to live accounts. No markup on institutional pricing. No onboarding fee. The assessment itself takes 3–5 business days.
References
Show all references
- European Union, Directive 2009/110/EC on the taking up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions (EMD2), Article 7 (safeguarding requirements), eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- European Union, Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market (PSD2), eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- European Banking Authority, Report on Virtual IBANs (EBA/Rep/2024/08), , eba.europa.eu, accessed .
- European Union, Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA), Articles 70 and 75, eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- Chambers and Partners, Virtual IBANs: the EBA’s report on their issuance and regulation, chambers.com, accessed .
- European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing (AMLR), Article 2 (vIBAN definition) and Article 22(3) (end-user information obligation for credit and financial institutions servicing the master account), eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Digital Asset Protection: A first look at client asset rules under MiCA, technologyquotient.freshfields.com, accessed .
- European Union, Regulation (EU) 2024/886 amending Regulations (EU) No 260/2012 and (EU) 2021/1230 and Directives 98/26/EC and (EU) 2015/2366 as regards instant credit transfers in euro (Instant Payments Regulation), eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- European Union, Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 establishing technical and business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro (SEPA Regulation), Articles 9, 10, and 11, consolidated text CELEX:02012R0260-20240408, eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
- Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM), Decision PV12B Agos Ducato S.p.A. (€800,000 fine for SEPA Article 9 breach), , en.agcm.it, accessed .
- European Court of Auditors, Special Report 01/2025: Digital payments in the EU, , eca.europa.eu, accessed .
- European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net), ECC-Net Calls for Stronger Enforcement to End IBAN Discrimination in the EU (4,688 cumulative complaints; LT 24%, BE 23%, DE 22%), , eccnet.eu, accessed .
- European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on Payment Services in the Internal Market (PSR) COM(2023) 367 and Proposal for a Directive on payment services and electronic money services (PSD3) COM(2023) 366, , eur-lex.europa.eu, accessed .
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